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The Abortion Debate
by Richard Garlikov

Preface

The abortion controversy has become one of the most divisive and irrationally contentious issues of our time, turned into a legal and political power struggle with no permanent resolution in sight. Yet it need not be. Social, and therefore media, attention has been focused almost exclusively on the differences between pro-life and pro-choice forces, rather than on the common ground they have; and that has been even further compounded by the fact that many actively involved people on both sides have been driven to extreme positions they do not really relish, simply out of fear that not seeking more than is necessary will yield less than is acceptable.

But there is more common ground among opposing sides than is realized. And there would be even more yet if the issue were discussed and portrayed in a rational way that sought mutually agreeable solutions rather than unconditional victories, particularly solutions that are consistent with those principles in many other areas of life that involve relevantly similar moral features (good samaritanism, normal privacy freedoms and limitations, definitions and consequences of negligence, responsibility limitations in non-negligent accident, etc.) areas where we already have accepted law and public consensus, or at least less divisive debate about which laws ought to be changed and what the content of the new laws ought to be (such as conditions allowing the withdrawal of life-support).

Many pro-life and pro-choice advocates cannot even accurately state the other sides' position; and many people cannot even state their own position in a way they would be comfortable with after even just a few questions that get them to reflect on it. Almost no pro-choice advocate believes, for example, that giving a woman choice over whether to have an  abortion or not means that she cannot make a wrong choice or choice that she would regret -- a choice made, and honored, say, in a moment of panic or fear, or a choice made on wrong information about the health of the fetus, the likely future quality of life of her child, or insufficient information about the resources available to help her have, care for, and successfully rear a healthy child. Almost no pro-choice advocate believes that abortion should be a person's chosen first-line method of birth control or method of gender determination.  Almost no pro-choice advocate believes that promiscuity or sexual irresponsibility (male or female) is a good thing or that either ought to be encouraged. Almost no pro-choice advocate thinks that teen-age sex or teen-age pregnancy is a good thing. Almost no pro-choice advocate believes that abortion is or ought to be considered a casual event or that it should be undertaken without reverence and respect for the life or potential life that is being ended. Almost none but the most zealous pro-life advocates think babies should be made to be born if that means they only suffer painfully and prolongedly until they die with nothing to somehow make up for that suffering. Almost no pro-life advocate can consistently maintain for any length of time their initial view that quantity of life is more important than quality, or, put in another way, that life under all circumstances is better than, and preferable to death under any circumstance. (They would have to disavow Patrick Henry's revered statement "Give me liberty or give me death", for example.)  Almost no pro-choice advocate thinks abortion is a good thing; but many simply think it is sometimes the best of a bunch of bad options; and that it would be better if women's other options were better so that abortion would not have to be chosen. Pro-choice advocates would prefer to see fewer abortions chosen voluntarily -- not by making abortion even less desirable due to more punishment, but by making the other alternative (in regard to having and rearing one's children reasonably) proportionally more desirable than it currently is.  Almost no pro-life advocate argues that it is better to force women to have babies they do not want than to help them want the babies they might have.

This booklet tries, first, to show what the worst and least relevant, least valid, of the abortion arguments from both sides are; second, to show what the real issues are, and how many of them relate to areas of settled law and accepted, or acceptably changing, public moral opinion; and third, it tries to offer some solutions that might be acceptable to, a much greater majority of Americans -- particularly with modifications that others might suggest -- than current law or any of the proposed laws I have seen yet. Even if some of my particular ideas are wrong, I  believe my approach points the way to a far better way to focus  the debate and deal with the issue of abortion, which the Congress or state governments may  eventually have to.

The point of this is to try to make the debate more  rational, more productive, and less divisive by (1) searching for  the most common ground possible, (2) pointing out morally relevant similarities to other areas of life that are not  controversial, (3) eliminating the common illogical and confusing arguments, (4) discussing the real needs of pregnant women and mothers, and seeking to find out what acceptable laws and social  changes might be necessary and sufficient to bring about more uncoerced and truly voluntary choices for birth rather than abortion, and (5)  fostering awareness of more reasonably effective ways of reducing the number of unwanted pregnancies. Then, after that we can perhaps leave to pure politics and power struggles the far fewer  kinds of cases that might not be mutually resolved.

Appendix I is a curtailed version of some of the ideas  expressed in the main body of this booklet. It was written at a  different time primarily for those interested in introducing programs that help solve the abortion problem and that help resolve the controversy. I believe it depicts at least the minimal understanding legislators ought to have before enacting  laws related to abortion.

The Use of Hypothetical Situations

I first wrote this in the late 1980's, and included in it hypothetical medical "fertility-related" procedures I thought would become available which would have relevance to the abortion issue.  Some of the kinds of cases, based on medical science, have since become reality.  Some of the cases I discuss are still in the range simply of theoretical possibility. But, even though many people do not like to consider or to try to come to terms with theoretical or hypothetical situations, I discuss such cases for three reasons: (1) they may someday be possible and even common, and I think we will need to deal with them then. And having an impartial framework now will make it easier to do that1, before decisions will be biased by vested interests and purely emotional, subjective, personal consequences; (2) they help us see aspects of conception, birth, and parental rights and responsibilities that we might otherwise tend not to notice or to take for granted; and (3) hypothetical situations can help us see a larger "picture" -- of how different elements involved in abortion relate to each other and to similar elements in other areas of life. Further, there is nothing about considering hypotheticals that requires policy to be based on them or wedded to them.  Given the, often interesting, surprising, and worthwhile, benefits from considering hypotheticals and given that what one thinks about a hypothetical situation does not necessarily commit one to have the same views about a similar, but real, situation which may also have additional elements one had not considered when just previously "thinking", I don't really understand some people's reluctance to consider hypothetical cases in order to help them better formulate and clarify their ideas.

A Note About Terminology

I have tried to use as value neutral terms as possible in the main section of this booklet in describing arguments and positions for and against abortion. I have not used terms like pro-life", "anti-life", "pro-choice", or "anti-choice", terms popular in polemical treatments which try to linguistically promote one's side while linguistically castigating the other.  In cases where I use terms like "embryo", "fetus", "prospective baby", "baby", "prospective person", "individual" to refer to the subject of abortion, or "prospective parents", "parents", "prospective mother", or "mother" when I am referring to the people who conceived that subject, I am not trying to persuade or prejudice by use of language. My arguments are intended to be spelled out, not hidden behind associated psychological connotations of words. It is difficult to find and/or to keep using value-neutral words. "Fetus" and "embryo" have a rather cold, sterile, impersonal sound; "baby", the opposite. "Baby" can refer to an already born infant; but it can also refer to the infant before it is born, in a fairly early stage of pregnancy, as in "Can you feel the baby move yet?" No one asks an unmarried pregnant woman who the "father-to-be" of the baby is; they ask who the "father" is, even though that person is not a father in the sense of male parent of an already born child. But no one would say a pregnant woman "has a baby" or in general call a man "a father" whose wife is expecting for the first time. At any rate, nothing should be made of my use of any of these words instead of their counterparts. I think any of them could be interchanged at any point with their psychological counterpart without affecting the validity of my comments. Where I have erred, it will not be because of connotations. Calling the fetus a baby or the baby a fetus is not meant to imply it is either more or less important or more or less alive or any such thing. Calling it an individual or a person or a prospective individual or prospective person is not meant to imply that it is more or less important depending on what you call it.

Similarly, when I talk about "fetal life" or "death", I do not mean to imply "life" or "death" as in following birth. Nor do I now mean to imply that they are necessarily different. The use of the terms by themselves is not meant to imply something not stated. I generally use the words "terminating the fetus" instead of "killing" the fetus because I do think "killing" has particular, strong connotations, but I realize "terminating" may be too cold and dispassionate for many. Again, nothing is meant to be hidden by my choice of words; I am only trying to stay as neutral in use of language as possible. My specific, individual arguments are not neutral and their meanings are not hidden.

The Abortion Debate
Purposes of this Paper

The purposes of this paper are (1) to show the weaknesses, invalidity, and irrelevancy of those arguments which have such flaws -- on both sides of the abortion issue, and (2) to show what the more important, relevant, and valid issues are in deciding the rightness or wrongness of abortion. I give my own particular arguments about those issues, but even if I am wrong about my judgments involving them, I believe I am right that those issues are relevant for making correct judgments. I am trying to steer the debate, which seems to me to be in large part irrational or irrelevant on both sides, to the grounds on which it ought to take place, and to the grounds on which to a great extent I believe it does take place in people's decisions.

Abortion is often debated as a women's rights issue or as a rights issue for the unborn. It is neither. It would be wrong to protect women's rights by simply ignoring the case for the unborn; and it would be wrong to protect the unborns' rights by simply ignoring the case for women. The issue is.......

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