This is not intended to be a complete analysis of what freedom is; it is intended to point out some important aspects of freedom related to economics and "free" markets. Free markets are not necessarily as free as the term implies because (1) there are often forces at work that irrationally determine (or at least highly influence) our desires, (2) there are arbitrary and/or artificial limitations on the kinds of trades and transactions which can or will occur, and (3) there are arbitrary and/or artificial forces at work that channel people into labor they would not prefer, and away from labor they would prefer, without those forces.

The perception of freedom is to a certain extent subjective. People who value order and security may feel freer in a society that has strict conformity, cohesive, stable values, a strong police force they trust or that imposes virtual martial law. People who resent that sort of social control may feel freer in a society where citizens can do as they please without being judged by society, or where they don't have to worry too much about arrest because of unbridled police, military, or state power even if it means potential crime makes it unsafe to go out alone at night. People with financial success in a free market economy may feel that kind of economy allows the most personal freedom; those who are financially unsuccessful, even if talented and extremely productive (such as an "unrecognized" artist, or an inventor ahead of his/her time) may feel the so-called "freedom to fail" is not a very worthwhile freedom to have and that free markets do not provide the most freedom, or at least not the most important freedoms.⁽¹⁾

The right to travel, for example, is frequently considered to be an important freedom. However, it makes little difference to a person who cannot afford to travel that the state allows travel (for those who can afford it). He does not feel free, and in a sense actually is not free to travel. The restraint on his travel is not directly imposed by others. Nevertheless there is such a restraint because there is no provision for supporting travel for those without their own resources to pay for it. Similarly with regard to other areas where one is free to choose various options, but only insofar as one can pay for what one chooses. People who cannot readily make money even though they work hard, or who do not wish to have to pursue money, but wish to pursue some particular worthy endeavor that is not financially profitable and who feel they have a legitimate need that ought to be served, may feel freer in a society where services are provided on the basis of some judgment or criteria other than money. For example, suppose a poor person has a child who is a very talented violinist or mathematician. Many people may feel, as I do, that the child's talents should be developed as fully as reasonable by the society even if the parents cannot afford a tutor or an instrument and lessons. If there is no formal or systematic mechanism established for such situations, many children will not be as free to develop their talents as they could be.

Or in a free market system that supports voluntary individual transactions, it may be easy to establish a voluntary health system that supports medical treatment for those willing to pay for it but not one that supports medical research nor public health preventions. Poorer people may have no recourse for treatment, but even wealthier people may fall victim to epidemics that could have been prevented with better public health measures or to diseases for which a cure would have been found if there had been adequate and reasonable research. Free market mechanisms may not readily support or easily permit the sorts of measures that might make individual voluntary free market medical care most successful. Yet a wealthy person may not realize that he has limited his own health by channeling money into hiring the best physicians instead of channeling it into a better research and public health system. Hence, he will feel he has the freedom to pursue the best health care when in fact he has actually limited that freedom without realizing it. The best doctors in a mediocre system may not provide as good health care as mediocre doctors in a better system where there is more knowledge and less chance of contagion to begin with.

Moreover, how resources are channeled in any system depends on the values of those with the power to channel them. In a free market system, normally those with the power to spend money (whether their own or that of an institution whose money they manage) channel labor or influence its direction. There is nothing by itself in the nature of a free market system, however, which prevents wealthier people from channeling money into medical research or public health in the name of their own enlightened medical self-interest. The point above was not that free markets cannot have good public health nor good research based solely on free market transactions; the point is that freely exercised choices may turn out to be poor choices and actually limit overall freedoms - not just in health care, but in almost any area. The reason I chose the health care system as an example is that it illustrates, with a fair approximation to reality, that people tend to make short-sighted choices about how they spend their money because they tend to think about health care only when they are ill and in need of a doctor. Very few people would think or opt to invest money into research just in order to try to find a cure for a disease they may develop in forty years or to prevent an unknown future epidemic that might victimize them. And almost no one would think to regret not having done so even if in forty years they die from something that such an investment might have prevented or cured.

Suppose some day science discovers a way to fully control climate, but we do not want to give scientists nor politicians nor any group -- even a majority of the planet's population -- the right to govern and control our weather. And suppose that we can also fairly accurately predict weather far in advance. Are we freer, with regard to our weather, because no person or people are determining it then we would be if we permitted such determination? We are not. If you know there is a hurricane or drought coming and you won't let anyone prevent it who could, then you are the one exercising the power to determine our weather, though you are doing it by preventing intervention rather than by causing intervention. The control and the decision in either case is yours. The legal ramifications may be different between pushing a little child into the path of an oncoming car and intentionally allowing the child to go up onto a highway when you could easily stop the child with no risk to yourself or anyone; but the moral culpability is the same. It is no less the "playing of God" to allow consequences one could readily prevent than it is to bring about those same consequences by positive action. Neglect of power to prevent evil, when it takes little burden or difficulty to exercise it, is not better nor less morally culpable than the use of power to cause it. Nor does the neglect of the power to prevent evil raise the amount of freedom in the society where evil is not (allowed to be) prevented.

With regard to economic forces and freedom the point is the same. There are economic forces at work in all kinds of economic systems, and those forces are not, at this time, fully understood in many complex systems of economics. Nevertheless in many cases, the unobstructed consequences of those forces, and the direction of those systems, are quite predictable and in many ways amenable to intervention. One might forswear such intervention on a number of grounds, but one cannot legitimately do so on the basis of raising the level of freedom in the society, for people are no more free, no matter how free they might feel, when they are ruled by forces they do not understand than when they are ruled by anything else.

If the consequences of a (relatively) free market system are predictable and less desirable than the consequences of that system with certain modifications, then deliberately preventing those modifications is every bit as restricting as is allowing those modifications to be made. It is just that different people will be affected differently by either choice; neither side is fully free either way if freedom is conceived of as being free from external pressures and forces.

I asked a committed laissez faire economic conservative whether she thought it was fair that four doctors could go through medical school with the same amount of ability, dedication, perseverance, and effort, and that the one who chooses to be a Beverly Hills cosmetic surgeon should make many more times the amount of money than the one who chooses public health service, the one who chooses to pursue cancer research, and the one who chooses to practice medicine in a very poor community. Is there anything remotely moral or deserving about a system that would permit such a distribution of remuneration? Her answer was "And I suppose you want to be the one who decides how people should be allowed to spend their money!"

I will answer this question more completely later, but for now I will say only "No, I don't -- as least no more than anyone else." What she does not realize is that there are forces at work now that govern how much we can earn and what we can buy, and that the people of Beverly Hills can keep a disproportionate amount of medical care away from the people in Appalachia by the choices we permit them to make and the power we permit them to exercise. By giving people freedom to earn relatively large portions of money in certain ways and spend it in other ways, we are preventing or at least impeding that money from getting to people who have other values and who would earn it and spend it differently. One may fairly and uncontroversially make a great deal of money, but since money is power, the choices made by a very wealthy person impact on all our lives and in some cases keep from us the kinds of services and products we might desire because the wealthy person has been able to channel away from us for his own ends the labor we need and would otherwise have, had money not been concentrated in his hands, thus drawing labor to him.

One can justify disproportionate income in many ways --harder work, causing greater good, or any of the rationales given in chapter 8 - but one cannot justify it on the basis of the freedom to choose to go into the most lucrative professions, since which professions are lucrative depends on prior choices about the economic system that will allow or cause some professions to be more lucrative than others and that will consign some professions basically to poverty or to modest incomes -- and not necessarily because they do less good or are less worthwhile. Certain choices will be more lucrative and more financially compelling than others in almost any economic and social system, and a person with convictions about freely and voluntarily following pursuits that are financially poorly rewarded simply because of the nature of the economic system, is consigned to less affluence (or even to poverty) than had he chosen something more lucrative but otherwise less interesting or less justifiable to himself. The freedom to starve or to be financially poor in order to do anything that is undeniably good and held to be important by all reasonable people, but which is not rewarded financially within an economic system, sometimes because other people prosper disproportionately doing what is financially rewarded in the system even though it is undeniably unimportant and in some cases even harmful, is a strange sort of freedom to have. How an economic or social system is structured often will cause income levels to be associated in general with different jobs or professions. Those who would like to do something they believe important and worthwhile but which is not financially rewarded by the nature of the economic system, are then less free than those who are more interested in earning much money regardless of the nature of the work they do. They are less free to make money, but those seeking to make money may, in some cases, be less free to follow higher pursuits. Freedom is not just a matter of being able to do what you want, but it is also a matter of not having what you want controlled and manipulated by others or by intangible or unintentional forces.

When my daughter wanted to have her ears pierced, I told her she wanted it only because all her friends were doing it -- that almost no one left to their own devices would wake up one morning and think how grand it would be to puncture some part of themselves, even to make showing off jewelry somewhat more convenient; but she denied that and said she just wanted to do it, and that her friends' having done it first had nothing to do with it. She really believed that, and she believed that peer pressure was only about one's peers trying to talk or coerce one into doing something one did not really want to. She did not understand or believe that peer pressure was something that sometimes influenced or determined your will and desires, not just something that influenced your behavior in opposition to your will and desires. She resented my contention that she was merely succumbing to "pierce pressure", because she thought it an unfair and atrocious pun and because she did not feel she had been coerced or talked into something she did not want to do.

Yet economic and market, especially marketing, pressures work on people in the same way. People inclined to chase money, regardless of wherever else the chase might lead, will be seduced, or allow themselves to be prostituted, into whatever leads to acquiring money, even if it is not something they would ever have wanted to do if there were no money in it. And people inclined to "keep up with the Jones" or inclined to purchase what is fashionable merely because it is fashionable, will spend their money in ways that might not be reasonable for them nor good for society as a whole.

And add to this that the woman mentioned above, who asked me whether I wanted to determine how money was properly earned and how money was properly spent, would not permit free market drug dealing, judicial bribery or the auctioning of judicial decisions, baby selling, or a host of other currently illegal and immoral activity, even though it would permit more "freedom", and her argument becomes that much weaker. What she is saying is that she thinks it is ok for people to be able to spend money or earn a good living in ways that the status quo permits, but that it is taking away from freedom to change the status quo. But what constitutes the status quo is, in large part, the result of chance or lucky accident, and in some part the result of forces we do not, and would not, submit to any longer, even though we blindly accept their consequences and the effects of their remaining remnants. My view is that freedom often comes in part more from doing what one knows to be right rather than in doing what is controlled by forces other than such knowledge. Unfortunately we cannot always know what is right but must rely on what is reasonable. Rationality, however, does not give perfect freedom because sometimes the rational thing will be the wrong thing -especially if one is missing important information to make the correct decision, and does not know that. Still, it seems that the pursuit of what is right is preferable, and more likely to be in line with real freedom, than relying simply on what is desirable at a given time, particularly when it is realized that desires can themselves be controlled or influenced.

It is important, however, to distinguish between following one's own belief about what is right, and having an allegedly "right view" forced on one by others. To say that one is free when one does what one knows to be right, as I did above, is different from saying one is free when one has a right action imposed or forced on him or her. In high school Lincoln-Douglas debate, one of the topics was whether there should be a higher value on cultural sensitivity or the commercial use of free speech when the two conflicted. The topic seems to make sense because everyone takes it to mean whether commercial free speech should be limited when it conflicts with the sensitivity of those not doing the speaking. But if one takes the topic literally, there would never be a conflict between being sensitive to others and speaking freely because sensitive people are no less free to speak their minds than insensitive people. It is not a limitation of freedom to be decent to others because you want to and feel that is right. It is only a limitation of freedom to be coerced to behave toward others in a way you don't feel they necessarily have a right to be treated. My own view is that autonomy is more important than doing right if the wrong one does, or might do, is not particularly harmful or devastating to anyone, including oneself, but that autonomy is justifiably limited when one is about to do something terrible and irreparable. But the best course is to "raise people's consciousness" or help them become sensitive to the needs of others, so that they voluntarily do what is right. That allows both autonomy and right action.

So in answer to her rhetorical question above, it is not that I think I, or anyone else or any group, large or small, should have the power, just as sheer power, to choose how money can be spent or earned or taxed. However, someone or some group will make that decision, whether intentionally or not, whether knowingly or not, whether formally or not, no matter what is chosen, so what I am interested in is that it happens in the most reasonable and broadly acceptable way after as many people as possible are aware of the choices, the forces at work, and the consequences of all the alternatives -- all this being open to constant revision as new information, new consequences, additional forces, and new opportunities are discovered. I would expect that to enhance freedom, not destroy it.

Doing so, however, raises the question of the legitimacy of laws and governmental policies that affect economic transactions. Either law is simply the selfish and sometimes arbitrary rule of the majority because the majority is powerful enough by their numbers and position or by their ability to take advantage of the political/socio/economic system, or law is some attempt, however difficult and however fraught with particular errors, to set the course of society in the direction consistent with ethics and morality. If law is just the arbitrary tyranny of the majority, there is no ultimately moral reason for those who undeservedly suffer from the law to obey it. If taxation or tax rates, for example, or special tax credits, or laws favorable to certain groups have no purpose other than to increase the power and wealth of those already powerful and wealthy; and if they have nothing to do with making life better for as many deserving people in society as is possible, there is no reason for those who are unable or unlikely to benefit from them ever to obey them voluntarily.

A view of law that states or implies that there is nothing wrong with the will of the majority or the will of the powerful acting through legislative majorities, would make law a kind of social game, one game of many possible games, that people could choose to play or not to play. If large numbers of people cannot benefit from the game, but can only contribute benefit to another group, it is not clear they have any moral obligation to play the game instead of opting for one that benefits them. They could steal or loot illegally because they have simply been unfairly, but legally, deprived of those goods. If there can be unfair laws that no one in power cares to correct, there is no reason for those unfairly disadvantaged to care about those laws.

And if law, say in America, is just a social game, then even though the Bill of Rights helps to prevent the tyranny of the majority by not allowing majority rule to tamper with, transgress, or ignore certain fundamental freedoms, insofar as the constitution or the courts do not recognize rights or obligations they morally or socially ought to, the constitution is just part of the game, although it makes the game somewhat more difficult for the majority.

My view of what the law ought to be, however, is the written and published codification of the principles a society, upon continual reflective consideration and sincere, honest dialogue, thinks it best to try to live by. The point of law ought to be to clarify to all and make explicit to all the principles of action that society believes will make it the best and fairest it can be, or there is no moral point in obeying the law. This does not mean there will not be conflicting points of view about what is best or fairest; this does not mean that mistakes will not be made, whether discovered by those who made them or not. The enterprise is too vast and too difficult to provide obvious infallibility; but the point is to reasonably try, since if one is not really even trying to pass the best and fairest laws, not just the most self-serving laws, then there is no moral reason, other than acquiescence or fear, for those unfairly burdened by laws to even care to obey them, especially if their disobedience does not do any great harm.

And since laws effect and control the economic system, what is true of laws and governmental policies in general ought to be true of economic laws and economic policies as well. They ought to be an attempt to create the best and fairest economic system possible. That does not mean there will not be disagreements and mistakes, particularly when there is insufficient evidence to make obvious conclusions; but there must be the sincere and reasonable attempt by government to create the best system, not just one that benefits those who are able to exert the most power and influence. If we are to rise above "the law of the jungle" where the most powerful can take what they want from those unable to defend themselves, then we must not simply substitute for it a "law of the economic jungle" where those who have the resources to exert economic control over others can simply use those resources to take what they want from those who cannot defend themselves economically.

A feeling of choice is often an important incentive to action. People may work harder and be happier in an economic system in which they feel freer than in one where they do not feel they have much choice, even if, in the first system, their choices are confined or manipulated (whether accidentally or intentionally) to such an extent that they have almost as little real choice as those people in the system that allows no options. Manipulation can take the form of advertising, of course, but it can also occur from peer pressure that results accidentally from the choices of a few key people, apart from any advertising or attempted manipulation by manufacturers. It occurs when stores offer sales or when manufacturers offer rebates, even if they have raised the price first in order to be able to offer the sale price. Manipulation can even go against the normal supply-demand curve, in those cases where setting a high price on something makes it seem far more valuable and desirable than almost identical products with a far lower price. Manipulation occurs with the setting of various interest rates to stimulate or slow (certain sectors of) business and the economy by making more or less money (available to) circulate. Manipulation occurs through electoral processes that seem fair and reasonable even when they are not as fair or reasonable as they could be or should be. People, for example, do not seem to mind as much when a majority prohibits an action as when an individual or a committee or a court ruling prohibits it, even if the prohibition is the same. There are exceptions, and, of course, the "tyranny of the majority" is sometimes recognized, particularly by its victims, but people will often accept laws in a democratic society that they would not accept from a different form of government. Manipulation or limitation or expansion of future choices occurs by the choice of highway sites and designs, by the development or not of mass transit systems, and by other development by community leaders, builders, planners, etc. Not all such actions are conscious manipulations (and conscious manipulations often, in fact fail because they become known), nor are they necessarily effective whether conscious or not, but they tend to put into play forces that strongly influence decisions people make. But even when such forces limit the options people have, as long as they do not seem to the people involved to be limitations, a society and an economy may thrive where it otherwise would not. General Motors had an advertising campaign for a while that expressed what many Americans do believe, that "Your car is your freedom." Yet anyone who has lived where there is good mass transit, and pragmatic and aesthetic urban design, with attractive and pleasant walking conditions, might feel quite the opposite, particularly after a day of lengthy car pooling, a day of severe rush hour congestion, or a time-consuming, expensive, and inconvenient auto repair experience. It is often the case that the automobile only fosters the suburban sprawl and lack of mass transit it is then needed to overcome.

Because "freedom" is such a complex concept, it might be better to speak of actions which are voluntary or autonomous, meaning by this that a person chose to do them without any feeling of coercion on his or her part regardless of the basis for his/her choice⁽³⁾. Giving in to psychological, biological, or social urges then may be considered to be voluntary or autonomous in that the action stems from your own choice, even if your choice is somehow determined by forces outside of your control, and even if it is not the choice you would make if you were looking at your options from a purely objective or reasonable point of view.

Now it is not necessarily unreasonable to give in to biological, psychological, or to social impulses or desires. Appetites do not necessarily lead people astray or down paths of future regret. They do not always cause choices or actions that are wrong. Even when there is no reason to do something other than that one has the desire to do it, that is not therefore wrong. It may even be a right or good thing. If one is hungry and the choice is between two foods that are equally healthy and one of them you crave, and the other you do not, it is reasonable to choose the one you crave, and it is good to get great pleasure out of it. There are a great many things in life where one's preferences or desires simply make one's choices then be the reasonable or right choice to make.

What is problematic are those cases where what is desired is also bad or wrong, often cases where one even knows ahead of time that one has a desire to do something, which once done, s/he will regret. Sometimes one will be torn between reason and impulse. But there are unfortunately many cases where impulse or desire will make you choose the wrong thing, but where you will never know it was wrong, particularly in those situations where social mores support or celebrate unreasonable choices and behavior. When a culture or sub-culture condones or encourages unreasonable behavior, it is difficult for those immersed in the group to see the irrationality that is clear to people outside the culture. Some people inside the group may see it, but they will have a difficult time getting others to agree.

Now economic planning is not only about dividing and distributing benefits and burdens the most efficiently and most fairly, but it is also about doing it in a way compatible with what is acceptable to human nature, particularly with regard to autonomy or voluntary choices; often referred to as freedom or liberty. What is the most acceptable to human nature is not always what is the most reasonable. And it is not always the way we would choose to do things if we were free of biological, psychological, and social pressures and desires to make choices which are not only irrational, but which are also bad or wrong. It is this aspect of business and of economics that causes conflicts and difficulties when different values and desires are held by different cultures or different people within a society. And it is this aspect of economics that makes rational planning or rational economic legislation difficult in societies where there is a diversity, particularly a conflicting diversity, of different desires and values, for it will often seem, and in a sense be, imposing and burdensome to force people to do what is right economically, even if it is ultimately in their own best interest.

I want to discuss one kind of example -- one different from typically discussed governmental or organizational management programs that are seen by some to impose taxes, regulations, responsibilities, or other burdens on people against their will. World-renowned, former child prodigy, violinist Midori gives concerts in New York schools to children. She, or her foundation, has also set it up so that at least one of these schools has instruction in musical instruments by professional musicians who come to the school to teach. The school principal and teachers are happy; the students apparently like it; the musicians are happy to do this. On a Public Broadcasting System program the principal and one or two of the teachers ecstatically praised Midori for doing this for them. And there is no doubt this seems to be a wonderful thing for the school and for the students.

My experience with schools, however, is that they are unlikely to have even entertained the idea for a program like this if it were offered them by a group of local, competent musicians who were not rich or famous or who were not affiliated with a famous institution. It is not seeing that students have music lessons that would likely prompt a school to establish a program like this; it is being able to associate such a program with a rich or famous person or renowned institution, that gives school officials the desire to accept the program. Otherwise school personnel tend to see the offer of such a program as meddling by people trying to tell them how to do their job. They also see such offers as criticism that they are not competent to teach children themselves or to know what things children need to be taught. The acceptance of Midori's program by a school is not terribly different from the appointment to a corporate or public institution board of famous or rich people, although boards also are either hoping for a donation from the person they appoint or they are assuming that a person who has demonstrated successful leadership in making money can also be a successful leader in the enterprise the board overseas. The irrational aspect of this is that it is the celebrity or reputation, not the specific expertise, of the person involved, that is attractive to those who appoint them. If a school or a board had to choose between someone rich and famous with no expertise on the one hand and someone with good ideas who was neither rich nor famous, they invariably will choose the former. Moreover, if someone not famous or wealthy presents an idea for a program, it will likely be summarily rejected.

There are cases where a rich or famous person does an excellent job and makes a great contribution. My objection is not that rich or famous people are not likely to rise to the occasion and make a valuable contribution to the enterprise. My objection is that there is not opportunity afforded to others to make as great, or even greater, contribution. Moreover, there should be some way at least to look for potentially successful leaders or programs based on the likely merit of the plans or skills required, not at the relative celebrity of the person who has made the proposal or who is a candidate for the position. There are many people who could make a contribution in schools and elsewhere, who would like to do so, but who are not given the opportunity simply because they are not wealthy or famous. That is a waste of potential labor and potential achievement.

Now it may turn out that there is no way to do this without relying on the impulse to please celebrities. It may be, for example, that if students were not impressed by Midori's fame to appreciate her talent and the instructional program she offered them, that they would not be interested in learning music. It might be they are only doing it so they can someday show Midori what they have accomplished. But if fame is not the necessary ingredient for success of a program, then opportunities are being squandered whenever any person's or group's voluntary offers are rejected simply because they are not a celebrity in the community.

1. Even the source of a requirement influences whether people sometimes feel it is a restriction of their freedom or not. If a company or if business etiquette, tradition, or hope for success, requires employees to wear suits, they may not feel wearing a suit is a restriction on their freedom. But those same people would probably resent the government's requiring them to wear a suit while they do the same work. Many companies offer group health care insurance, and employees typically see that as a perk or benefit even though the company has chosen the provider and the plan provided, often with no input from many of the workers, and often though a different provider or insurance plan would better suit many of the individual workers. If you want to work for that company and you want group health insurance through them, you must accept their provider and plan, and yet employees don't normally see this as a forced purchase with no choice.  (Return to text.)
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 

2. The questions, of course, are whether the state or individual families, or neighborhoods, or whole "villages" are better able to nurture, or what the relative roles and responsibilities of each ought to be. In the Massachusetts Bay Colony, for example, parents had the primary responsibility to educate their children to become productive members of society, but the colony itself was responsible for giving the child a productive education if the parents failed to do so. Both were, in a sense, responsible but the townships could not usurp the parents' role; they could only take over in a case of parental default of their responsibility. If we look just at school districts alone today in this regard, there is a vast difference, in regard to the relative roles and responsibilities of government and families, between systems that require attendance at a neighborhood school and those which allow district-wide or inter-district transfers. In some cases there might be an even bigger difference if vouchers made possible attendance at private schools. Various nuances are possible in all sorts of areas of life so that the answer to the question "Who has the responsibility to provide children with enlightened understanding?" does not have to be an all-or-nothing, simplistic one.  (Return to text.)
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 

3. This is not a universal meaning for "voluntary" or "autonomous" either, so it will be important in any discussion to explain that one means some form of uncoerced action even if the choice was strongly influenced and not altogether free in some sense of being uncaused. Coerced choices are not free, but some uncoerced or voluntary actions are nevertheless not free either. What we tend to care about when speaking of having freedom and liberty is not being coerced. We do not care whether our desires are somehow free or uncontrolled; we only care whether we can voluntarily act as we desire.  (Return to text.)